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hirty years ago, during a Doors concert, Jim Morrison "pulled
down his pants to reveal the band's fifth member."1 Twenty years ago,
Mick Jagger straddled a giant inflatable penis on stage at a Rolling
Stones concert. 2 Lou Reed used to shoot up drugs on stage.3 These
examples illustrate how rock 'n' roll has a long past of pushing the
norms of accepted behavior. Despite this history, many states have
recently raced to propose concert-rating regulations in their legislatures.
To some, "the spark that lighted the fires ... was a year-long tour by the
cross-dressing hard-rock group Marilyn Manson that ended in fall 1997.
' '4
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Context of Concert Rating
Since the dawn of rock 'n' roll, peo-
ple have asserted the immorality of
certain songs and musical artists. 14
Recent attempts to regulate the
music industry began in 1984 when
the National Parent Teachers
Association of America (NPTA)
requested that the Recording
Industry Association of America
(RIAA) require record ratings. 15 At
that time, the RIAA ignored requests
for a mandatory labeling system.
16
However, the RIAA began to consider
these labeling requests when a pow-
erful citizens' group, the Parents
Music Resource Center (PMRC),
formed and began to take action.
1 7
Headed by Tipper Gore and con-
taining ten other members who were
the wives of either senators or other
cabinet members, the PMRC disap-
proved of the way "many of today's
artists advocate aggressive and hos-
tile rebellion, the abuse of drugs and
alcohol, irresponsible sexuality, sexu-
al perversions, violence and involve-
ment in the occult."' 18 In a letter to
the RIAA dated May 31, 1985, the
PMRC made its own request for
mandatory record ratings. 1 9 The let-
ter implored the RIAA to "exercise
voluntary self-restraint perhaps by
developing guidelines and/or a rating
system, such as that of the movie
industry."20 An additional memoran-
dum asked the RIAA, among other
requests, to print lyrics on the
album covers, devise a rating system
to inform parents of which albums
are suitable for children, place the
rating marks on the covers of the
albums, and rate music concerts. 2 1
As a result of the PMRC's
requests, the RIAA announced that
its member companies such as BMG
Music, Geffen Records, Motown,
Elektra, and Arista would attach
generic warning stickers, suggesting
parental guidance, on some of their
records.2 2 However, the PMRC was
not satisfied with this generic warn-
ing system, 2 3 especially since some
record companies initially refused to
comply with the rating system.
2 4
One month after the RIAA imposed
the labeling system, the Senate
Commerce Committee, five of whom
were married to PMRC members,
held hearings on the subject of record
labeling systems. 25 Due to concerns
about violating the First Amend-
ment, 26 however, the hearings did
not prompt any federal regulation of
the RIAA or its members.
2 7
Although the federal government
was unwilling to impose regulations
on the music industry at that time,
state and local governments were














ty, sadomasochism, rape or involun-
tary deviate sexual intercourse" or
"advocate or encourage murder, eth-
nic intimidation, the use of illegal
drugs or the excessive or illegal use
of alcohol."'29  Eleven other states
introduced similar legislation. 3 0 In
response to legislative "threats" of
governmentally mandated warning
labels, the RIAA agreed to a new uni-
form warning sticker, which would
be "easier for casual consumers to
identify. '3 1 After the announcement
of the new warning label, most legis-
latures dropped pending bills,
although a few states waited to drop
the bills until certain of industry
compliance. 3 2 Although no state leg-
islature has passed a record labeling
law since, some are now considering
concert labeling/rating laws.
History and Structure of Concert-
Rating Bills
Attempts at concert rating first
began at a local level on November
14, 1985, in San Antonio, Texas,
when ordinance 61,850 was
passed. 3 3 According to the ordi-
nance, it is illegal
for a
child
who is under the
age of 14 and without a parent
or legal guardian to attend a concert
that is considered obscene as to
minors. 34 In addition, if the concert
is considered obscene for children,
the ordinance requires that all
advertising contain a parental advi-
sory and warning that no child under
the age of 14 will be admitted with-
out a parent or legal guardian. 35 In
order to determine whether a concert
is obscene, the ordinance sets forth
an obscenity standard, discussed
later in the Note, that mirrors the
Supreme Court's current standard
for obscenity.3 6 Although the San
Antonio ordinance is still good law,
its constitutionality has never been
challenged because no one has yet
been prosecuted under it.37
Today, concert-rating bills are
again circulating in several state leg-
islatures. Michigan is at the fore-
front of this trend. The proposed
Michigan bill does not proscribe a G,
PG, PG-13, R, NC-17 rating system
like the one used by the movie indus-
try. Instead, it imposes notification
standards on concerts of "adult" nature.
In 1997, Michigan State Senator
Dale Shugars proposed Senate Bill
239 to allow Michigan
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However, the
opposition to this bill
from venue operators, the music
industry, and the American Civil
Liberties Union forced Shugars to
revise its original form. 3 9  The
revised bill required, instead, that
the warning, "harmful to minors" be
printed on all tickets and advertising
for concerts of adult nature. 40 This
revised bill, however, also failed to
pass.41
The newest version of the bill is a
milder version of the original. It
requires that if an artist's record has
a parental advisory notice printed on
the label, then the advertising and
tickets to that artist's concerts must
also have the same warning label.4 2
Although Senate Bill 239 does not
attempt to restrict minors' atten-
dance at concerts, it still raises con-
stitutional concerns because the
state government is attempting to
place restrictions on speech.
Whereas the warning on the artist's
album originates from the record
industry's self-regulation, Michigan
Senate Bill 239 proposes governmen-
tally imposed regulations on speech.
Therefore, the proposed bill is subject
to First Amendment scrutiny.
The question now is whether the
San Antonio ordinance and the pro-
posed Michigan Senate Bill are con-
stitutional. In other words, can the
government, in accordance with the
First Amendment, restrict minor's
attendance at "obscene" concerts, as
per the San Antonio ordinance? And
can the government, in accordance
with the First Amendment, require
warning labels on tickets and adver-
tising of concerts of adult nature, as
per both the San Antonio ordinance
and Senate Bill 239?
General Purpose of the
First Amendment
The First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech."
'43
As the Supreme Court observed, "the
very purpose of the First Amendment
is to foreclose public authority from
assuming a guardianship of the pub-
lic mind through regulating the
press, speech, and religion."4 4  In
fact, an important difference
between a democratic society and a
totalitarian government is that
American people have an absolute
right to propagate political opinions
"the government finds wrong or even
hateful."
4 5
A principal "function of free speech
under our system of government is to
invite dispute."4 6 Freedom of expres-
sion and public discussion lends
itself to America's societal goals of
"individual dignity," a "capable citi-
zenry," and each individual's right to
make his or her own political deci-
sions. 4 7 Freedom of speech might
best serve these societal goals "when
it induces a condition of unrest, cre-
ates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are or even stirs people to
anger."48 "If there is a bedrock prin-
ciple underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because socie-
ty finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.' ' 49 After all, "one man's
vulgarity is another man's lyric."
50
"The constitution leaves matters of
taste and style ... largely to the indi-
vidual."
5 1
Extent of First Amendment
Protection
The Supreme Court has held that
protected expression is not limited to
the spoken word.5 2 For instance,
conduct such as nude dancing5 3 and
flag burning 54 has been held to be
expressive. In deciding whether con-
duct contains sufficient expressive
elements to warrant First Amend-
ment protection, a court must con-
clude that the actor intends to "con-
vey a particular message" and that
the "likelihood [is] great that the
message [will] be understood by
those who [view] it."
' 55
The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that First Amendment protec-
tion extends not only to political
speech but also to entertainment in
the form of movies, radio and televi-
sion broadcasts, live entertainment,
and musical as well as dramatic
works. 56 For instance, in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, the
operators of an adult bookstore
installed a coin-operated machine
that allowed customers to view a live
nude dancer.57 The owners were
subsequently convicted under a zon-
ing ordinance prohibiting live enter-
tainment.58 Reversing the convic-
tions, the Court held that nude danc-
ing was a form of expression protect-
ed by the First Amendment.
5 9
Musical lyrics and concerts are
entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion both because they constitute
political speech and because music is
a form of entertainment. 60 In Ward,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that "music is one of the oldest forms
of human expression. '6 1  In that
case, the Court upheld New York
City's sound amplification guideline
for live music performances. 6 2 The
Court stated that throughout history,
"rulers have known [music's] capaci-
ty to appeal to the intellect and to the
emotions, and have censored musical
compositions; ... [however] the
Constitution prohibits any like
attempts in our own legal order."
63
Therefore, as an entertaining form of
expression and communication, music
is covered under the First Amend-
ment's blanket of protection.
6 4
First Amendment Implications for
Government Regulation
The First Amendment limits the
government's power to "restrict
expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent. ' 65 "It is a central tenet of the
First Amendment that the govern-
ment must remain neutral in the
"marketplace of ideas. ' '66 However,
the government may still impose
''reasonable restrictions on the time,
manner, or place of protected speech,
provided the restrictions 'are justi-
fied without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant interest, and that they leave
open ample alternative channels for
communication of the informa-
tion."' 67 Otherwise, government reg-
ulation of speech on the basis of its
subject matter "slip[s] from the neu-
trality of time, place, and circum-
stance into a concern about con-
tent. '68 These types of permissible
regulations are also known as "con-
tent neutral" restrictions.
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
the Supreme Court upheld a regula-
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for live music perform-
ances. 70 This regulation
was not aimed at the content or the
message of the music, but solely at
the manner in which it was con-
veyed. 71 The city sought to control
noise levels at bandshell events by
ensuring that the volume was loud
enough to satisfy the audience with-
out being so loud as to intrude upon
the neighboring residents. 72  The
court found the city's guideline was
"narrowly tailored to serve the sub-
stantial and content-neutral govern-
mental interests of avoiding exces-
sive sound volume and providing suf-
ficient amplification within the band-
shell concert ground, and the guide-
line leaves open ample channels of
communication." 73  Therefore, the
regulation was a valid time, place,
or manner regulation under the
First Amendment.
7 4
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lawless action
and is likely to incite or
produce such action," is excluded
These cate- from First Amendment protection. 87
speech find no The Supreme Court first articulated
tective wing of this standard in Bradenburg v.
because they Ohio. 88 There, the Court found that
the "market- a speaker at a Ku Klux Klan rally
act, any benefit was merely advocating an abstract
from "words of teaching rather than "preparing a
e ... is clearly group for violent action and steeling
ial interest in it to such action. '8 9 Therefore, the
speech was not "directed to inciting
rds" doctrine or producing lawless action," nor is it
nendment pro- "likely to incite or produce such
by its "very action."90 Since the standard articu-
s] to incite an lated by the Court was not met, the
the peace." 83  speech was not advocacy of illegal
linsky v. State conduct and was consequently pro-
a Jehovah's tected by the First Amendment.
ochester City Malicious false statements of fact
god damned are also excluded from First
imned Fascist Amendment protection.9 1 New York
)vernment of Times Co. v. Sullivan dictates that a
's or agents of false statement of fact about a public
ovah's Witness figure on a public issue is not pro-
victed of violat- tected by the First Amendment if the
'e statute that statement was made with "actual
ing offensive malice. '92 A statement is made with
"actual malice" if it was made "with
knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."93  In that case, the
police commissioner of Montgomery,
Alabama, sued the NEW YORK TIMES
because it reported that he had
arrested Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
seven times, when actually he arrest-
ed him fewer than seven times.
9 4
The Court found the speech was pro-
tected by the First Amendment




Attempts to regulate music lyrics
and concerts are based mainly on the
theory that some music lyrics are
obscene, and obscenity is not protect-
ed by the First Amendment of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court
has set out a three-step approach in
order to determine whether certain
speech is obscene. 9 6 The first issue
the trier of fact must determine is
whether "the average person [rather
than a particularly sensitive or par-
ticularly insensitive person], apply-
ing contemporary community stan-
dards would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest in sex."'9 7 In deter-
mining whether the material is erot-
ic or sexually stimulating,98 the
Court mandated reliance on commu-
nity standards, believing "people in
different states vary in their tastes
and attitudes."99 The Court wanted
to make certain that diversity was
not "strangled by the absolutism of
imposed uniformity."
10 0
The second obscenity inquiry is
whether the speech "portray[s] sexu-
al conduct [specifically defined by
applicable state law] in a patently
offensive way."10 1 This inquiry is
also to be determined under contem-
porary community standards. 102 A
few examples of "patently offensive"
sexual conduct include "descriptions
of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated ... rep-
resentation or descriptions of mas-
turbation, excretory functions, and
lewd exhibition of the genitals."103
The final inquiry is whether the
speech, "taken as a whole," has "seri-
ous literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value." 10 4 Unlike the first two
obscenity criteria, this third factor is
judged not by individual community
standards, but by "whether a reason-
able person would find such value in
the material, taken as a whole."105
The danger in using the community
standard here is that a jury member
could feel obligated to follow prevail-
ing local views on "value" instead of
considering whether a "reasonable"
person would "value" the work. 106 In
other words, the value of a work
should not vary from community to
community based on the local degree
of acceptance. 10 7 The materials will
only be deemed "obscene," and the
state will only be permitted to regu-
late the materials, if all three ele-
ments are present.' 08
"Obscenity" Depends on Context
Words vary in meaning based on
context. 109 Therefore, First Amend-
ment protection of arguably obscene
speech depends heavily on the con-
text in which it is said.110 Often, the
medium and the audience are impor-
tant considerations when determin-
ing whether arguably obscene speech
is constitutionally protected."'
Depending on the audience, the same
speech may merit First Amendment
protection in one context but not in
another.11 2 Specifically, it is well-
1'75 .. . . . .
established that when certain speech
is directed at children, it may be
afforded less First Amendment pro-
tection than when the same speech is
directed at adults.
11 3
One example of that phenomenon
is that some speech, which is merely
indecent when directed at adults,
and thus constitutionally protected,
is deemed obscene when directed at
minors. Unlike obscenity, indecency
does not have to appeal to the pruri-
ent interest.1 1 4 With respect to
minors, however, indecent speech
may qualify as obscene. In order to
determine whether indecent materi-
al is obscene as to minors, the same
three-step test set forth in Miller
11 5
is applied, with one small change.116
The first step becomes whether "the
average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a
whole,"11 7 appeals to the "sexual
interests ... of ... minors.
'1 1 8
In Ginsberg v. State of New York,
the Supreme Court held that states
have the power to adjust the defini-
tion of obscenity by "permitting the
appeal of this type of material to be
assessed in terms of [what might
appeal to] the sexual interests ... of
... minors."" 9 States have that abil-
ity to adjust the definition of obscen-
ity because "the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reach-
es beyond the scope of its authority
over adults."1 20  Thus, identical
speech may be afforded First
Amendment protection when direct-
ed at adults but denied protection
when directed at minors. 12 1
Regulating Speech Deemed
to be Obscene When
Directed at Minors
States are afforded greater power
to regulate obscene speech available
to minors than if the speech were
available only to adults. 122 However,
"the mere fact that a statutory regu-
lation of speech was enacted for the
important purpose of protecting chil-
dren from exposure to sexually
explicit material does not foreclose
inquiry into its validity."12 3 Courts
have held that a state has a com-
pelling interest in regulating mate-
rial that is obscene to minors but
the means of regulation must be
narrowly tailored to accomplish
that state purpose without unduly
interfering with adult access to pro-
tected material.
12 4
The state has a compelling inter-
est in regulating obscenity as to
minors when it finds that exposure to
obscene material might be physically
or psychologically harmful.12 5 The
Court does not require that the state
produce scientific proof of the effects
of obscenity on minors.
12 6
Ginsberg found the state had a
compelling interest in regulating
material which was obscene as to
minors. 12 7 In that case, the Court
upheld a statute that prohibited the
sale to minors of material which was
deemed obscene with respect to
them. 128 Specifically, the Court held
that the "state has an interest 'to
protect the welfare of children' and to
see that they are 'safeguarded from
abuses' which might prevent their
'growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens."'
12 9
After deciding a state has a com-
pelling interest in regulating obscen-
ity as to minors, a court will deter-
mine whether the regulation was
narrowly tailored to accomplish its
purpose without interfering with
adult access to protected material.
The Court in Ginsberg found the reg-
ulation was narrowly tailored to
accomplish its purpose of protecting
minors' welfare. 13 0 The regulation
was narrowly tailored because the
state regulated material that was
obscene to minors, but did it in such
a way so as not to interfere with
adults' access to material that was
merely indecent as to them. 13 1 By
protecting children from potentially
harmful material without prevent-
ing adult access, the state accom-
plished its goal of narrowly tailor-
ing the regulation.
132
In Butler v. Michigan, on the other
hand, the state criminalized distribu-
tion of materials to the general pub-
lic that were found to have potential-
ly harmful influence on minors.
1 33
The Court found the law to be "insuf-
ficiently tailored since it denied
adults their free speech rights by
allowing them to read only what was
acceptable for children."1 34 Justice
Frankfurter described the situation
at hand using the frequently quoted
statement, "[s]urely this is to burn
the house to roast the pig."1 35  In
other words, the Court did not allow
"the government to reduce the adult
population... to... only what [was]
fit for children."136  Similarly, in
Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, the Supreme Court decided
that two provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA) violated the First
Amendment. 137  The Court based
this decision, in part, on the CDA's
suppression of material that adults
have a constitutional right to send
and receive. 1
38
Aside from unconstitutional inter-
ference with protected adult materi-
al, a regulation can also be struck
down if it is overbroad. The First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine is
based on the theory that a person
"whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exer-
cising [his or her] rights for fear of
criminal sanctions by a statute sus-
ceptible of application to protected
expression." 1 39 However, a court will
only invalidate a statute based on
overbreadth if it inhibits a "real and
substantial" amount of protected
material. 140 In other words, even if
there are a few situations where a
statute might infringe on legitimate-
ly protected First Amendment speech
and conduct, a court will not invali-
date it if the "remainder of the
statute covers a whole range of easi-
ly identifiable and constitutionally
proscribable . . . conduct."
14 1
Moreover, a statute should not be
held facially invalid unless the court
is unable to limit its construction.
14 2
In Erznoznik, the Supreme Court
held that a statute which prohibited
drive-in theaters from showing films
containing nudity when its screen
was visible from a public street or
place was unconstitutional.1 43 The
state passed the first part of the two-
part test in that it had an interest in
protecting the well-being of its youth,
but in this case the regulation was
held to be unconstitutional because it
was not narrowly tailored to accom-
plish its goals. 14 4 The regulation
was overbroad because instead of
being directed against sexually
explicit nudity, it forbade display of
"all films containing any uncovered
buttocks or breasts, irrespective of
context or pervasiveness." 14 5  The
implication of the ordinance was
such that minors would be prohibited
from viewing a baby's buttocks,
newsreel scenes from art exhibits,
nude bodies of war, and so forth. 14 6
Not all nudity is obscene with respect
to minors, and "speech cannot be sup-
pressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative
body thinks is unsuitable."
' 1 47
In New York v. Ferber, the
appellee claimed a statute "prohibit-
ing persons from knowingly promot-
ing a sexual performance by a child
under the age of 16 by distributing
material which depicted such a per-
formance" was overbroad because, in
addition to pornography, it would bar
distribution of "material with serious
literary, scientific, [or] educational
value."14 8 The Court concluded the
statute was not substantially over-
broad. 14 9 Its legitimate reach, which
is hard core child pornography,
"dwarfs its arguably
impermissible appli-






ical textbooks or NATIONAL
GEOGRAPHIC could arguably fall with-
in the reach of the statute, the Court
found this to be a statute that could
easily be limited by the lower
courts. 15 1 In other words, any dan-
ger of overbreadth could be cured on
a case-by-case analysis.
152
In following the overbreadth doc-
trine, a state must ensure any limi-
tation on freedom of expression is not
too vague or indefinite.1 53 A statute
that limits freedom of expression
must give fair notice of what acts will
be punished. 1 54 In Winters v. People
of State of New York, a bookdealer
was convicted of possessing and
intending to sell magazines whose
content violated §1141 of the New
York Penal Law. Section 1141 stated
that anyone who "intend[s] to sell ...
any book, pamphlet, magazine,
newspaper or other printed paper
devoted to the publication, and prin-
cipally made up of criminal news,
police reports, or accounts of criminal
deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds
of bloodshed, lust or crime; is guilty
of a misdemeanor."155 The Court
found this specification of publica-
tions "too uncertain and indefinite to
justify the conviction of [the] peti-
tioner."156 For instance, descriptions
of war horrors, which are otherwise
''unexceptionable," might be found to
be "vehicles for inciting violent and
depraved crimes."15 7  Due to the
vagueness of this regulation, a dis-
tributor of publications could not rea-
sonably be expected to foresee and
guard against violations. 158 As a
result, materials that would
otherwise be
acceptable
under §1141 risk cen-
sorship by a bookdealer who is
unsure where to draw the line
between the allowable and the
forbidden material. 159
Content-Based Regulation is
Permissible as to Minors
Even if Speech is Not Deemed
Obscene as to Minors
The First Amendment does not
prohibit all governmental regulation
that depends on the content of the
speech.160 Specifically, "vulgar and
offensive" speech that is not obscene
even as to minors can be unprotected
depending on its context.1 6 1 In this
line of cases, the Court states that
material relating to sex or dirty
words can be regulated based on its
content even without a finding of
obscenity as to minors. As with
material obscene for minors, any
interference with adult access is
purely accidental and can therefore
be justified under a time, place, man-
ner analysis. In other words, con-
tent-based regulation imposed on
children's access to certain material
is actually subject to a content-neu-
tral time, place, manner analysis in
the context of adults since any inter-
ference with adult access is purely
accidental. Under the time, place,
manner analysis, the court will bal-
ance the extent of the accidental
interference with adult access to
material with the state's in prevent-
ing access by minors. Three cases
that demonstrate this analysis are
FCC v. Pacifica, Sable Communi-









be regulated when broadcast on the
radio. 163 Although the Court found
the broadcast was not obscene, even
to minors, regulation was still per-
missible because the state had an
interest in limiting minors' access
vulgar and offensive material.1 64
The state's interest focused on pro-
tecting minors from potentially
harmful material, especially consid-
ering that "broadcast is a uniquely
pervasive presence that confronts
people in the privacy of the home,"
and that "broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children."1 65 In addi-
tion, the state had an interest in reg-
ulating this broadcast because the
broadcast spectrum is a "scarce"
expressive commodity. 166 The Court
then balanced these state interests
with the extent of the accidental
interference with adult access to
material, which was not great
because the regulation did not
involve a complete ban on the mate-
rial, and found that the regulation
was constitutional. 16 7 However, in
its conclusion, the Court empha-
sized the narrowness of its holding
in light of the limited context of
broadcasting. 168
In Sable, a company that was
engaged in the phone sex business
challenged an amendment to the
Communications Act that prohibited
all indecent and obscene interstate
commercial messages. 169 This case
was distinguished from Pacifica
because the material in Pacifica was
not completely banned, unlike the
dial-a-porn in this case. Another dis-
tinction between Sable and Pacifica
is that here, in contrast to the radio
broadcast, the "listeners were
required to take affirmative steps to
receive communication." 170 "Placing
a telephone call is not the same as
turning on a radio and being taken
by surprise."17 1  Nonetheless, the
Court agreed the state did have a
interest in protecting minors from
potential harm. 172 With respect to
regulation of indecent speech, the
government relied on Pacifica to find
that the state objective was to limit
minors' access to the material, and
that any interference with adult
access was purely accidental.
Because the interference with adult
access was accidental, the Court per-
formed a time, place, manner analy-
sis. Since the regulation effected a
complete ban, the extent of the inter-
ference with adult access outweighed
any government interest. The Court
concluded that the regulation was
unconstitutional. 173
Most recently, the Court decided
Reno v. ACLU. 174 In that case, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996
made criminal the knowing trans-
mission of obscene or indecent mate-
rial via the Internet to anyone under
18.175 This Court was also willing to
use a time, place, manner analysis
because although the regulation was
content-based, its intent was to pro-
tect children, not limit adult access
to the material. Although the gov-
ernment has an interest in protect-
ing children from potentially psycho-
logically harmful material, the Court
found the regulation to be unconsti-
tutional. 1 7 6  The Court did not
uphold the regulation because the
government's interest was not
enough to justify the extent of the
accidental interference with adult
access to the material.1 77 The Court
found that there were other, less
restrictive means available to protect
minors from potentially harmful
material on the Internet.1 78 In addi-
tion, the Internet provides unlimited
capacity for low-cost communication,
so the state lacks the same interest
in regulating a "scarce" expressive




As an entertaining, artistic, and
political combination of both conduct
and speech, music concerts are pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
18 0
Because music concerts are protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment, the government is
limited in the restrictions it can place
on them.18 1 The restrictions placed
on music concerts by the San Antonio
ordinance and the proposed
Michigan statute are not content-
neutral time, place, or manner
restrictions such as those in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism.18 2 These reg-
ulations are based on the actual sub-
ject matter or the content of the mes-
sage. Therefore, in order for the
statute and ordinance to be upheld,
they must narrowly regulate only a
certain type of speech that has
been removed from First Amend-
ment protection.
As Both a Political and
Entertaining Form of Speech,
Music is Protected by the
First Amendment
To say that music does not classify
as political speech is to ignore folk
music from the 1960s, rap music of
today, and many other genres in
between. 18 3 Music during the 1960s
and early 1970s teemed with politi-
cally charged messages about civil
rights and war.184 Another example
where political messages are embod-
ied in music lyrics is urban rap
music. 1 85 "Controversial rappers are
some of the most ardently political
musicians. Many drive home a mes-
sage of ... social justice and racial
equality." 186 Since music is clearly a
form of political speech, it enjoys
First Amendment protection. 18 7 In
addition, as stated above, music
finds constitutional protection as
an entertaining form of expression
and communication. 18 8
Government Attempts to
Regulate Music Have Been
Based on the Lack of
Constitutional Protection
Afforded to Obscenity
Attempts to regulate music lyrics
and concerts are based primarily on
the theory that some music lyrics are
obscene, and obscenity is arguably
not protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution.
Thus, an obscene song or obscene
music concert would not warrant
protection under the First
Amendment and could be regulated
by the government. In practice,
though, "no work of
music alone has yet










obscene, but ultimately found that
the state failed to prove the recording
was obscene.
190
Skyvwalker Records. Inc. v.
Navarro was decided on June 6,
1990, and was the first time a feder-
al court ever considered whether a
musical composition was obscene.
1 9 1
Focusing solely on the lyrics and not
the instrumental music that accom-
panied the lyrics, the judge deter-
mined that "As Nasty As They
Wanna Be," a record by 2 Live Crew,
was obscene under the Miller test for
obscenity.19 2 The plaintiffs, 2 Live
Crew and their record company, pro-
duced several expert witnesses.
19 3
Dr. Mary Haber, a psychologist testi-
fied the recording did not appeal to
the average person's prurient inter-
est.19 4 Two additional expert wit-
nesses, who were familiar with the
origins of rap music, discussed 2 Live
Crew's innovations within the rape
genre.195 In addition they noted
that a Grammy Award for rap music
had recently been introduced, which
indicated that the recording industry
recognizes rap as a "valid artistic
achievement." 19 6  Therefore, the
experts concluded 2 Live Crew's
music did possess serious artistic
value. 197 Finally, Carlton Long, a
Rhodes scholar with a Ph.D. in polit-
ical science, testified that 2 Live
Crew's lyrics contained "political sig-
nificance [and] exemplified numer-
ous literary conventions, such as
alliteration, allusion,
metaphor,
rhyme.. , and<.. °:
117 / . j % S:
rhyme, and ...... '-K
personification."
1 9 8
On the other hand, the defendant
produced no expert witnesses as to
the prurient interest nor did he pro-
duce expert witnesses as to the liter-
ary, artistic, or political value of the
music. 19 9 In fact, defendant's only
evidence was a tape recording of the
music itself. Nonetheless, relying
solely on his own expertise, the judge
determined that the average person,
applying contemporary community
standards would find that "As Nasty
As They Wanna Be" appealed to the
prurient interest and as a whole
lacked serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, and scientific value.
2 00
On appeal, the federal district
court's obscenity determination was
reversed. 2 01  The appellate court
reversed because it found the record
was insufficient to assume the trial
court judge had the artistic or liter-
ary knowledge or skills to determine
whether a work "lacks serious artis-
tic, scientific, literary or political
value."20 2 In a noteworthy dictum,
the appellate court stated, "we tend
to agree with the appellants' con-
tention that because music pos-
sesses inherent artistic value, no





The San Antonio ordinance is
probably constitutional on its face




< Miller with the
varying obscenity
language set forth
i in Ginsberg. 20 4 In
Ginsberg, the Court
upheld a New York
.J statute prohibiting
the sale of obscene
material to minors under 17.205
Similarly, the San Antonio ordinance
attempts to regulate minors' expo-
sure to obscene material that could
have potentially harmful effects. 20
6
A court would probably find that
San Antonio has a compelling inter-
est in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of its youth
and can therefore regulate obsceni-
ty 20 7 as long as the means of regula-
tion are narrowly drawn to accom-
plish that state purpose. Thus if the
San Antonio concert-rating regula-
tion were challenged, the state would
merely have to show that it was
rational to conclude that material
depicting "sadistic, masochistic or
violent sexual relationships, ' 20 8 for
instance, might be harmful to the
psychological well-being of chil-
dren. A court will give great defer-
ence to this determination without
requiring any scientifically certain
evidence linking obscenity and
moral development.
20 9
In addition, the regulation must
be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest if it is to withstand a consti-
tutional challenge. With this
requirement in mind, a state govern-
ment must consider the possible con-
sequences on constitutionally pro-
tected speech when it adopts regula-
tions and procedures for dealing with
obscenity.2 10 The court must consid-
er whether the regulation of unpro-
tected "obscene as to minors" speech
would have a chilling effect on other
protected and valuable speech.
2 11
State regulation of obscenity must
''conform to procedures that will







obscenity only by a
dim and uncertain
line."2 12  In fact,
obscenity laws often
"run the risk of sup-
pressing protected expression by
allowing the hand of the censor to
become unduly heavy."
2 1 3
In the case of the San Antonio con-
cert-rating regulation, where the
state government is regulating mate-
rial that is obscene to minors, it is
important that the regulation be nar-
rowly tailored so as not to interfere
with adults' access to protected mate-
rial. For instance, the material in
Ginsberg, which was only judged
obscene as to minors, was still avail-
able to adults.2 14 On the other hand,
the law in Butler was held unconsti-
tutional because while limiting
minors' access to material that was
deemed harmful to them, the law
also limited adults' access to materi-
al that was protected in the context
of adults. On its face, the San
Antonio ordinance allows material
obscene as to minors to be limited
from minors while still remaining
available to adults.
However, there is speculation that
a regulation such as this, if enforced,
would have unconstitutional conse-
quences by eventually limiting
adults' access to protected material.
One source for this speculation is
that on December 2, 1998, Pearl Jam
announced the band would not




tem.21 5 Nina Crowley argues that
if concert-ratings happen "on a wide
scale, some music will disappear. If
Marilyn Manson can't play live, his
record company can't make any
money."21 6 However, none of these
regulations suggests that Marilyn
Manson cannot play live.
Even if a court finds the San
Antonio ordinance to be constitution-
al on its face, a constitutional appli-
cation of the three-part Miller test
should result in the conclusion that
almost no imaginable concert could
be deemed obscene, even as to
minors. In accordance with the first
part of the test, the fact finder must
determine whether the material
appeals to the "prurient interest" of a
minor, "meaning that it [is] intended
to cause sexual stimulation."21 7 One
way to determine whether material
is "intended to cause sexual stimula-
tion" is to examine the manner in
which the materials are market-
ed. 21 8 Just as rock and rap albums
are marketed and sold as musical
entertainment, rather than "adult"
material, so are rock, rap, and other
musical concerts.21 9 If the concerts
were truly "intended" to cause sexu-
ally stimulation, it is inconsistent
that they be marketed as musical
entertainment rather







result in a find-
ing of obscenity
is that it would
be extremely difficult to
show that a musical concert does not
have serious literary, political, or
artistic value. 2 20 As one commenta-
tor has defined the term, "a work
has serious value if the 'intent is to
convey a literary, artistic, political, or
scientific idea, or to advocate a posi-
tion."2 21  It is a relatively safe
assumption that musicians who per-
form in concert do intend to convey
an artistic idea. 2 22  In addition,
experts can testify that even vulgar
lyrics can contain "political signifi-
cance [and] exemplified numerous
literary conventions, such as allitera-
tion, allusion, metaphor, rhyme, and
personification."22 3
Another reason San Antonio
would not be able to show that a
music concert is obscene, even as to
minors, is that it would be almost
impossible to determine that a con-
cert "taken as a whole" appeals to the
"prurient interest" of a minor or that
the concert "taken as a whole" lacks
"serious literary, artistic, [or]political
• . . value." Even if the fact-finder
decides certain lyrics to a song
appeal to the "prurient interest" of a
minor, a song as a whole might not
since its "vocal presentation and
melody [also] contribute to its mean-
ing."22 4 "Likewise, just as magazines
comprised of separate articles are
considered whole works, an album
made up of distinct songs might also
be considered as a whole.'
2 25 It fol-
lows that it will be very difficult to
determine that a concert with multi-
ple lyrics, multiple melodies, multi-
ple vocal presentations, and multiple
actors each performing in their own
way, "taken as a whole," appeals to
the "sexual interests ... of... minors,"
and lacks "serious literary, artistic,
[or] political . . . value." 226
Under the Miller test for obsceni-
ty, it is very difficult to imagine any
concert that could be classified as
obscene. This is theory is supported
by the fact that since the ordinance
was enacted in 1985, no one has ever
been prosecuted under it. As dis-
cussed above, it is unlikely that a
concert would fit the definition of
even one of the Miller prongs. It is
even more unlikely that a concert
would meet the requirements of all
three of the Miller prongs, which
would be absolutely necessary before
a court could say the concert was
obscene. Thus, if San Antonio were
to ever prosecute a party under this
ordinance, and if that party were
found to have violated the ordinance,
it would most likely mean there was
an unconstitutional application of
San Antonio ordinance 61,850.
A successful prosecution using a
Miller analysis is highly unlikely. If
San Antonio wanted to successfully
regulate minors' attendance at cer-
tain concerts, the city should have
written an ordinance that did not
require the application of the Miller
obscenity test. For instance, San
Antonio could have written an ordi-
nance that limited minors' access to
concerts that are vulgar and offen-
sive, and that ordinance would then
be subject to the same time, place,
manner-type analysis that was used
in Pacifica. The time, place, manner
analysis appropriate because
although the regulation would be
content based with respect to chil-
dren's access, it would only be an
accidental interference with adult's
access to the material. The city
would argue that the purpose behind
the ordinance is not to limit adult
access to the concerts, but simply to
limit minors' access to concerts that
contain potentially harmful materi-
al. A party challenging the new ordi-
nance would, of course, argue that
Pacifica has a narrow holding limited
to the context of broadcasting.
However, courts are likely to be sym-
pathetic to a regulation whose pur-
pose is to protect minors. That being
the case, the court would use the
same time, place, manner analysis as
used in Pacifica. The state's interest
in its minors would be balanced
against the extent of the accidental
interference with protected adult
material. Assuming adults still had
access to the concerts, a court would
find that the ordinance is only a
slight interference. Finally, the court
will determine that the city's interest
in protecting the children does justi-
fy the slight interference to adult
access.
In sum then, as written, the San
Antonio ordinance is constitutional
on its face because the city would
have a compelling interest in regu-
lating obscenity and the ordinance is
narrowly tailored so as to not inter-
fere with adults' access to protected
material. However, the ordinance
really has no practical use if ana-
lyzed using the Miller test for obscen-
ity. When Miller is applied in the
context of musical performances,
there are almost no imaginable con-
certs that could, under a constitu-
tional analysis, ever be found
obscene. The only way San Antonio
could constitutionally regulate
minors' access to certain concerts is if
the city wrote an ordinance that
could be analyzed under a time,





Senate Bill 239 appears less intru-
sive than the San Antonio ordinance
since it is regulating material that
was judged by the music industry
itself, rather than by a government
official. It almost seems logical to
extend the self-imposed warning
labels placed on records to the tickets
and advertising for concerts per-
formed by those artists. However, a
statute's constitutionality must be
based on something more substantial.
To reiterate, music concerts are
protected by the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment, and the gov-
ernment is limited in the restrictions
that can be placed on them. 22 7 Since
the proposed Michigan statute is not
a content-neutral restriction, it must
regulate only speech that has been
removed from First Amend-ment
protection. 2 28
At first glance, there appears to be
a problem with the proposed statute
because it is content-based regula-
tion, yet it does not restrain material
deemed to be obscene even as to
minors. Instead, Senate Bill 239
places restrictions on material on
which the RIAA has already placed
parental warnings. However, mate-
rial deemed to have "explicit content"
by the RIAA is not necessarily the
same as the Court's definition of
obscenity; therefore the proposed
statute is in danger of regulating
material that is protected by the
First Amendment.
However, as in the Pacifica, Sable,
Reno v. ACLU line of cases, content-
based regulation of material, other-
wise protected by the First
Amendment, is possible. In the case
of Senate Bill 239, the government
would argue that the purpose behind
the statute is not to limit adult access
to the concerts, but simply to limit
minors' access to concerts that con-
tain material potentially harmful to
minors. Therefore, this statute
only accidentally interferes with
adult access to material and should
be analyzed using a time, place,
manner analysis.
A party opposed to the statute
would try to distinguish it from
Pacifica, which is a case where the
content-based regulation of constitu-
tionally protected material was
upheld. Unlike the broadcast spec-
trum, concert halls and arenas are
not such a scarce expressive com-
modity. In addition, the medium of
communication is more similar to
that in Sable than in Pacifica
because concert-goers have to take
affirmative steps to attend a concert;
this medium of expression is not
thrust upon unwilling listeners in
the privacy of their home.
Even so, a court using a time,
place, manner analysis would proba-
bly conclude that this regulation is
constitutional by balancing the
state's interest in its minors with the
extent of the accidental interference
with adult's access to protected mate-
rial. Unlike Sable, this statute does
not completely ban the material; the
warning labels on the advertise-
ments and tickets are only a slight
interference with adult access.
Therefore, a Court would probably
find the state's interest in protecting
the children does justify the slight
interference to adult access. In sum,
then, under the Pacifica, Sable, Reno
v. ACLU line of cases, Senate Bill 239




Even if the San Antonio ordinance
and the proposed Michigan statute
are constitutional, there are practical
problems with implementing con-
cert-rating regulations in general.
Gary Bongiovanni, editor of the
American music-trade magazine
POLLSTAR, doubts there is any way to
implement such regulations.22 9 He
reasons that "rock concerts are fluid
and changing; you could give the
Stones a PG rating one evening, and
something X-rated happens the
next. '2 30 "Bands often change their
set lists and onstage routines," and
there is concern as to whether a rat-
ings system could respond to such
variables. 2 3 1  A crucial difference
between concerts and movies, which
are currently subject to private regu-
lation, is that [concerts] are live, so a
band could change its act to get a PG
rating and then, when onstage, give
the fans an R-rated version. '2 3 2
Another difficulty with implement-
ing the San Antonio ordinance, in
particular, is that simply verifying
the age of concert-goers at an "adult"
performance could take up to eight
hours.23 3 Finally, there is a question
to the practicality of putting the
warning on the ticket, as proposed in
the Senate Bill 239, since it wouldn't be




Alternatives to government regu-
lation of concerts do exist. Hilary
Rosen, president and CEO of the
RIAA, said she would "oppose any
attempts to restrict minors from
attending rock concerts but would
not object to an efficient [self-
imposed] parental warning system
similar to the one her organization
established for albums 12 years
ago."2 3 5 Mark Michaelson, aide to
Senator Shugars, agreed that "if the
industry comes up with something
that works and will be observed, that
will be a great thing too."2 36 Since at
least 1997, people in the concert
industry have been evaluating con-
cert-rating proposals in an attempt
to avoid restrictive legislation.
2 37
The proposals range from an indus-
try-wide self-imposed obscenity
warning labels to self-imposed
imposing ratings that mirror current
movie ratings.
23 8
November 1, 1968, marked the
beginning of the voluntary film rat-
ing system of the motion picture
industry.23 9 Before that date, the
Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) only went so far as
approving or disapproving of the con-
tent of film. 240 In 1968, however, the
MPAA decided to give movies letter
ratings based on theme, language,
nudity and sex, violence, and how
each element was treated in each
individual film. 24 1 Jack Valenti,
president of the MPAA at the time,
explained that the ratings "provide
advance information to enable par-
ents to make judgments on movies
they wanted their children to see or
not to see."
2 42
There are other industries that
have also implemented successful
self-imposed rating systems. For
instance, the computer industry
rates its games. 2 43 "E" indicates a
game that is appropriate for anyone
to play.24 4 A "T" rating means the
game is appropriate for teenagers
and older due to bad language and
bloodshed in the game. 24 5 "TA" is
the rating placed on computer games
recommended for teen-adult audi-
ences due to material with some sex-
ual content.2 4 6 Finally, an "M" rat-
ing demonstrates the game is only
appropriate for mature audiences,
"which means anything goes includ-
ing hunting nuns and orphans with a
flame-thrower."2 47 Some book clubs
also have symbols indicating poten-
tially offensive or inappropriate
material.2 48 For instance, one book
club uses a star for material with a
"sexually explicit theme."24 9
Finally, if government-imposed
concert-rating systems do not gain
popularity, and even if the concert
industry does not impose a rating
system on itself, there are other safe-
guards for minors. One major safe-
guard is consumer power. If an artist
wants to be invited to perform, he or
she may have to market to what the
audience wants. For instance,
"protests ... surrounding Manson
performances have been common in
cities nationwide. And there is evi-
dence that his reputation is already
costing him concert dates."250  "In
South Carolina, for example, Manson
was booked last year to play the
Carolina Coliseum Arena in
Columbia. But that aroused the ire
of so many in town that he was asked
- and paid well - to go away, accord-
ing to venue director John Bolan."
25 1
In fact, numerous scheduled per-
formances by Manson have been can-
celed because of the band's controver-
sial performances. 2 5 2 This is not a
"chilling effect" resulting from a spe-
cific governmental regulation - yet.
It is simply the effect of consumer
power.
"There's also the argument that
by the time a performer is popular
enough to play an arena, there's
more than enough information about
him or her available (including stick-
ers on CDs, music videos and articles
in the press) for parents to make an
informed decision about a child
attending a show."2 5 3 Many promot-
ers are sensitive to the needs of the
parents because they know that ulti-
mately, most parents still buy the
tickets.2 54 For example, some con-
cert halls and arenas even provide
"quiet rooms" for parents who want
to accompany their teenage children
to concerts. 2 55 These "quiet rooms"
usually provide complimentary cof-
fee, "blessed silence," and an oppor-
tunity for parents to be involved in
their child's concert experience.
2 56
And the Band Played On-
For Now
Concert-rating statutes are an up-
and-coming phenomena. Logically,
they seem like the next step after
record warning labels and in light of
other ratings being implemented
across the entertainment industry.
However, unlike warning labels and
other rating systems in the enter-
tainment industry that are self-
imposed, concert-rating statutes may
be products of government regula-
tion, and some teeter on the border of
violating the First Amendment.
One of the concert-rating statutes
that would withstand a constitution-
al challenge is San Antonio ordi-
nance 61,850, which attempts to reg-
ulate access to concerts that are
"obscene" in the context of minors.
This ordinance is constitutionally
valid on its face because it mirrors
the Miller/Ginsburg test for "obsceni-
ty." However, as written, the ordi-
nance with its obscenity standard
has no practical application to con-
certs. San Antonio should have con-
sidered wording the ordinance so
that it could be analyzed using a
time, place, manner analysis.
The other concert-rating attempt
discussed in this Note is proposed
Michigan Bill 239. Like the San
Antonio ordinance, this proposed bill
would probably also withstand a con-
stitutional challenge. Although the
regulation is content based with
respect to children's access, it only an
accidentally interferes with adult
access to the material. The state's
interest of protecting children from
vulgar and possibly harmful material,
balanced against the very slight inter-
ference on adult access to the materi-
al, would justify the regulation.
Even if a concert-rating statute is
constitutional, there are inherent
practical problems with its imple-
mentation. In light of these practical
problems, it is worthwhile for gov-
ernments and the concert industry to
explore the many alternatives to con-
cert-rating statutes. *
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Sec. 21-91. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this article the following words and terms shall have the
meanings respectively ascribed:
Aid or assist shall mean intentionally or knowingly concealing, dis-
guising or misrepresenting the age of a child.
184--_
Control over city-owned facilities shall mean any person, or employ-
ee of such person, authorized by lease to produce, direct, participate in
or perform any musical, dramatic or theatrical performance at a city-
owned facility. This term shall not include peace officers in perform-
ance of their official duties.
Direct shall mean commanding movement of any actor, performer,
stage equipment or stage props.
Explicit reference shall mean the use of words which have a readily
recognizable meaning describing or depicting conduct proscribed here-
by, but shall not include words which are merely suggestive or have
meanings which are equally consistent with actions not proscribed
hereby.
Intentionally, knowingly, recklessly shall have those meanings as
defined in the Texas Penal Code.
Leased area shall mean that area of a city-owned facility identified
by lease providing for performance of a musical, dramatic or theatrical
production.
Participate shall mean placing or moving equipment or props used
in a musical, dramatic or theatrical production.
Perform shall mean acting or performing a musical, dramatic or
theatrical production.
Performance shall mean any musical, dramatic or theatrical pro-
duction performed by any individual or identifiable group whether or
not the production includes more than one individual or identifiable
group staged in a city-owned facility.
- Performance obscene as to a child shall mean a performance which
contains a description of or explicit reference to:
(a) Anal copulation;
(b) Bestial sexual relations;
(c) Sadistic, masochistic or violent sexual relationships;
(d) Sexual relations with a child;
(e) Sexual relations with a corpse;
(f) Exhibition of male or female genitals;
(g) Rape or incest; or
(h) A vulgar or indecent reference to sexual intercourse, excreto
ry functions of the body, or male or female genitals; and
which, taken as a whole: (1) Appeals to the prurient interest
of a child under the age of fourteen (14) years in sex; and (2)
violates generally prevailing standards in the adult commu-
nity as to the suitability of such performances for observa-
tion of a child under the age of fourteen (14) years; and (3)
lacks any serious, artistic, literary, political or scientific
merit as to a child under the age of fourteen (14) years.
Person shall mean any individual, partnership, corporation or other
legal entity of any kind.
Produce shall mean contractual responsibility for advertising, stag-
ing or setting up a musical, dramatic or theatrical production.
Sec. 21-92.ADMISSION OF CHILDREN.
No person having control over a city-owned facility shall intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly allow or permit a child under the age of four-
teen (14) years to enter or to remain within a leased area in a city-
owned facility within one hour before or at any time during a perform-
ance is scheduled, if such person (1) knows, or (2) has knowledge of
sufficient facts and circumstances from which a reasonable person
would know that the performance is or will be a performance obscene
as to a child, unless such child is admitted with a parent or legal
guardian.
Sec. 21-93. PRODUCING, PERFORMING, DIRECTING OR PAR-
TICIPATING IN A PERFORMANCE.
No person shall intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly produce, per-
form, direct, or participate in a performance within the leased area if
such person:
(1) Knows; or
(2) Has knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances from
which a reasonable person would know that:
(a) A child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age is
present without a parent or legal guardian; and
(b) The performance is or will be a performance obscene as to
a child.
Sec. 21-94. ADVERTISING AND NOTIFICATION.
Any person who shall produce or direct a performance, and who (1)
knows, or (2) has knowledge of such facts and circumstances from
which a reasonable person would know that the performance is or will
be a performance obscene as to a child shall cause and provide by con-
tract or otherwise for inclusion in any advertising for
such performance the following notice:
"This performance may contain material not suitable for
children without supervision. Parental discretion is
advised. No child under the age of fourteen (14) years of
age will be admitted without a
parent or legal guardian."
No person shall intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly contract for or
obtain any advertising for a performance which is obscene as to a
child, without providing for the notice required by the foregoing sen-
tence to be included therein.
Sec. 21-95. AIDING OR ASSISTING A CHILD IN ATTENDANCE.
No person shall intentionally or knowingly aid or assist a child under
the age of fourteen (14) years not accompanied by a parent or legal
guardian in gaining admission to, or in remaining present during a
performance which the actor (1) knows, or (2) knows such facts and
circumstances from which a reasonable person would know that the
performance is or will be a performance obscene as to a child.
Sec. 21-96. DEFENSES.
It shall be an affirmative defense to any prosecution under Section
21-92 above if the person having control over a city-owned facility
attempts to ascertain the true age of a child seeking entrance to a per-
formance obscene as to a child by requiring production of a birth cer-
tificate, school record, including identification showing the child's age
or other school record indicating the child to be enrolled in eighth
(8th) grade or higher, and not relying solely on oral allegations or
apparent age of the child.
Sec. 21-97. PENALTIES
Each act or failure to act as required herein shall be punishable by a
fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than two hundred
dollars ($200.00).
Sec. 21-98. SEVERABILITY.
If, for any reason, any one or more sections, sentences, clauses or
parts of this article are held legally invalid, such judgment shall not
prejudice, affect, impair or invalidate the remaining sections, sen-
tences, clauses or parts of this article.
Sec. 21-99. APPLICABLE EFFECTIVE DATE.
The requirements of this article shall apply only to leases providing
for performances of musical, theatrical or dramatic productions in




36 A performance obscene to a child is defined as a performance which
contains a description of or explicit reference to:
(a) Anal copulation;
(b) Bestial sexual relations;
(c) Sadistic, masochistic or violent sexual relationships;
(d) Sexual relations with a child;
(e) Sexual relations with a corpse;
() Exhibition of male or female genitals;
(g) Rape or incest; or
(h) A vulgar or indecent reference to sexual intercourse, excreto-
ry functions of the body, or male or female genitals;
and which, taken as a whole: (1) Appeals to the prurient
interest of a child under the age of fourteen (14) years in
sex; and (2) violates generally prevailing standards in the
adult community as to the suitability of such performances
for observation of a child under the age of fourteen (14)
years; and (3) lacks any serious, artistic, literary, political or
scientific merit as to a child under the age of fourteen (14) years.
See SAN ANTONIO, TEX. Ordinance 61,850 (Nov. 14, 1985); for the
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42 1999 Bill Text MI S.B. 239. As of May 25, 1999, Senate Bill 239
read as follows:
Sec. 1. (1) If a performers recorded music will be per-
formed at a music venue and if during the 5 years prior
to the date of the performance, the performer released
recorded music containing a parental advisory label
issued by the recording industry as to the explicit content
of the recorded music, the owner or operator of the music
venue or the promoter of the performance shall comply
with at least 1 of the following:
Tickets that are sold for the performance at the music
venue shall contain, in boldfaced print not smaller
than 9-point type, an advisory stating: "PARENTAL
ADVISORY WARNING : EXPLICIT CONTENT".
Print advertisements for the performance at the
music venue shall contain, in boldfaced print not
smaller than 9-point type, an advisory stating:
"PARENTAL ADVISORY WARNING: EXPLICIT
CONTENT'.
Television, radio, or other electronic advertisements
for the performance at the music venue shall contain
the following:
If spoken, and advisory that states: "This artists
music has received the recording industry's parental
advisory due to explicit content".
If written, the advertisement shall contain, in bold
faced print not smaller than 9-point type, and adviso-
ry stating: "PARENTAL ADVISORY WARNING:
EXPLICIT CONTENT"'.
This section does not apply to a performance at a music
venue by a performer whose appearance has not been
advertised or promoted.
As used in this section, "music venue" means a commer-
cial venue where live music performances are held.
Sec. 2. A person who violates this act is guilty of a mis-
demeanor punishable by a fine of not more than
$5,000.00.
Enacting section 1. This act takes effect upon the expira-
tion of 60 days after the date of its enactment.
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